🔒 What does Friendstime protect — and what not?
We won't promise you "everything is 100 % encrypted" — that wouldn't be honest. We tell you exactly which data is end-to-end encrypted, which the server can read, and what encryption technically cannot hide.
📋Status 19 November 2026: what works – and what does not yet
A short, honest list in plain words. “Post-quantum hybrid” means: a proven method (X25519) and a new method (ML-KEM) are used together. This is extra protection, not a guarantee.
✅ This works
- Live streams run through our own server in Germany. The connection to it is protected with post-quantum hybrid TLS, provided your browser supports it.
- You can send a live stream via RTMPS, for example with OBS – that is, over an encrypted connection.
- Recordings of live streams are stored encrypted and deleted after 24 hours.
- Clips can be made from the last minute of a live stream (1-minute buffer).
- Calls: the key is exchanged using a post-quantum hybrid method.
- Sealed Sender is in a test phase: the server does not learn who sent a message. In the test this also covers hidden recipients, media and the notification.
- Posts to friends are end-to-end encrypted – but only if all recipients have a key. Otherwise the post remains readable for the server.
- On the web, your private keys are wrapped in the new key envelope sym-v1 – without the older RSA.
- Location: positioning runs through our own service, not through Google.
- The app needs no Google services and no Firebase. Notifications are delivered by our own service.
- Your data is stored on servers in Germany (EU).
- Optionally reachable via Tor: Friendstime has its own onion address for the Tor Browser.
- Connection to the website: TLS 1.3. The key is exchanged with a post-quantum hybrid method (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) if your browser supports it – otherwise with the classical method.
- The website can only be reached over an encrypted connection; your browser is told to keep it that way permanently (HSTS).
- Mail server: connections for receiving, sending and fetching mail (SMTP, IMAP) offer the same hybrid key exchange. Other mail servers must deliver e-mail to us encrypted (MTA-STS in “enforce” mode).
- Protection against forged senders: SPF in its strict setting, a DKIM signature on outgoing e-mail and a DMARC policy (“quarantine”).
- The spam filter runs on our own server. E-mails are not passed to other companies for this.
- Sign-in: you can turn on two-factor sign-in (a code from an authenticator app) and passkeys.
- After several wrong sign-in attempts, sign-in is slowed down for a while – per account and per internet address.
- In the settings you can see your signed-in devices and sign them out.
- Calls, storage and the vault have rate limits against abuse. Internet addresses are not stored in plain text for this.
- Uploaded files: the file type is checked by content, not by file extension. For photos that the server receives in readable form (for example posts, groups, marketplace), location and camera data (EXIF) are removed.
- The database is backed up daily in encrypted form. Older copies are kept in tiers (days, weeks, months).
- An automatic watch regularly compares the website’s files with the expected state and reports differences.
- You can report security vulnerabilities through a form without signing in. The contact is also listed in the security.txt file.
- When you delete your account, your mailbox, your stored files and your entries in the search index are removed as well. Data we are required by law to keep (for example invoices) stays for the prescribed period.
- The website loads no analytics or advertising scripts from other companies. The only third-party script source is the payment provider on payment pages.
🕓 This does not work yet
- Sealed Sender is not yet available for groups.
- In calls, only the key exchange is post-quantum protected. Sound and picture themselves (WebRTC) are not yet.
- Signatures use only Ed25519 or RSA. There are no post-quantum signatures yet.
- Database backups are encrypted with X25519 only, so they are not post-quantum protected.
- The moderation key has not been set up yet. That is why end-to-end encryption of posts currently runs only in a test group.
- The app is not yet available on F-Droid.
- Some translations are machine-made and may contain errors.
- E-mails are not end-to-end encrypted. They are stored on our mail server; the operator is technically able to access them.
- The DMARC policy is set to “quarantine”. The stricter level “reject” is planned but not yet switched on.
- A separate backup of mailboxes only starts on 20 November 2026.
- The post-quantum part applies only to connections to our own servers. The link to the web host and its older mail access use classical TLS.
- Two-factor sign-in and passkeys are optional, not mandatory.
- So far there is no independent audit, no certification and no reward programme for reported vulnerabilities.
Being rolled out step by step: new accounts get their hybrid keys automatically. Older accounts are upgraded at the next login.
🗺️What is encrypted where and how?
| Area | Protection | Who can read it? | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
One-to-one chats (text) |
Post-quantum hybrid: X25519 + ML-KEM-768, combined with HKDF-SHA256, content AES-256-GCM. Mandatory: the server does not accept other formats. |
Only you and the other person |
✅ active |
Group chats |
The group key is wrapped for each member using post-quantum hybrid. If a member lacks the hybrid key, nothing is sent. Groups that were never encrypted remain plain text. |
Only the members or participants |
✅ active if everyone involved is up to date |
Photos, voice messages, files |
Content AES-256-GCM, key wrapped per recipient using post-quantum hybrid. |
Only you and the other person |
✅ active if everyone involved is up to date |
Calls (one-to-one and group) |
Audio and video end-to-end (AES-GCM), call key exchanged using post-quantum hybrid. If someone cannot do hybrid, only transport encryption remains – with a visible notice. Live captions and the in-call chat are not end-to-end encrypted. |
Only the members or participants |
✅ active if everyone involved is up to date |
Live location |
Positions AES-256-GCM, key wrapped using post-quantum hybrid. Without hybrid, nothing is shared. |
Only you and the other person |
✅ active |
Moments and places |
Wrapped using post-quantum hybrid (X25519 + ML-KEM-768), content AES-256-GCM. |
Only the members or participants |
✅ active if everyone involved is up to date |
Vault and private notes |
Encrypted on the device with AES-256-GCM, key wrapped using post-quantum hybrid. Shared vault links: AES-256-GCM, the key is only in the link. Older plain-text notes are encrypted when opened. |
Only you; for shared links: whoever has the full link |
✅ active |
Moving to a new device |
Post-quantum hybrid with ML-KEM-1024 + X25519; only this version is accepted. |
Only you (your devices) |
✅ active |
Your private keys (stored on the server) |
Protected with your password (AES-256-GCM). On the web, the wrapper around the post-quantum keys is now the new symmetric wrapper sym-v1 (without RSA). The app still uses RSA-2048 (classical). |
Only you (your devices) |
⚠️ partly classical |
Notifications (push) |
Our own push service, no vendor services. The app fetches content per device encrypted with post-quantum hybrid; browsers and older apps via TLS. Notifications for encrypted messages contain no content. |
Our server (operator) |
✅ active |
Hiding the sender (sealed sender) |
Test phase: post-quantum hybrid, now also with mailboxes and media. The sender signature still uses RSA-2048 and is therefore not post-quantum protected. So far only for test accounts. |
Concerns metadata, not content |
🕓 gradual (test accounts) |
Connection browser/app ↔ server |
TLS 1.3 with the hybrid key exchange X25519MLKEM768 (older browsers: classical X25519). HTTP/3 is temporarily switched off because of a security vulnerability. The internal forwarding to the web host uses classical TLS. |
Our server (operator) |
⚠️ partly classical |
Call relay (TURN over TLS) |
The call relay (coturn) now uses TLS with post-quantum hybrid. Audio and video are additionally end-to-end encrypted inside it. |
Concerns metadata, not content |
✅ active |
Posts, profiles, comments |
Okuthunyelwe komphakathi, amaphrofayela namazwana kugcinwa kufundeka kuseva (i-TLS ekudluliseni). Okuthunyelwe kubangane, ngabangane abasondelene noma “mina kuphela”: ukubethela okuphelele kuze kube sekugcineni (okuxubile) kuqala kuma-akhawunti okuhlola kuphela futhi kuphela uma bonke abamukeli benekhiye. |
Our server (operator) |
🕓 gradual (test accounts) |
Recordings (livestream/call) |
Only with consent. Recordings are stored encrypted on the server (AES), the download links are signed with HMAC, and everything is deleted after 24 hours. This is not end-to-end encryption: the server can read the recording. |
Our server (operator) |
✅ active |
Clips from live streams |
The last minute of a live stream is kept only in the memory of the live server (1-minute buffer). It is saved only when someone creates a clip. |
Our server (operator) |
✅ active |
Going live via RTMPS (e.g. OBS) |
Encrypted with TLS (classical, not post-quantum protected). Not end-to-end encrypted: the live server sees the video. |
Our server (operator) |
⚠️ classical only |
Emails |
TLS (classical) when sent. In the mailbox, emails are stored with the respective email provider. |
Our server and the email providers involved |
⚠️ classical only |
Database and backups |
Account and profile data, posts and metadata are readable by the server; individual fields (e.g. IBAN, two-factor secrets) are additionally encrypted. Database backups: X25519 (classical). |
Our server (operator) |
⚠️ partly classical |
Metadata |
Who communicates with whom, when and how much is needed by the server for delivery – this cannot be encrypted. |
Our server (operator) |
⚠️ visible |
Signatures and safety numbers |
Classical (Ed25519). There is no post-quantum signature method yet. |
Concerns authenticity, not reading |
⚠️ classical only |
Private notes about contacts |
Encrypted on your device (AES-256-GCM, key X25519 + ML-KEM-768 to your own account); the server only stores the encrypted content. Notes from older app versions are encrypted the next time you open them. |
✅ Post-quantum hybrid | |
Passwords |
Not stored in plain text but as a hash (Argon2id, partly with an additional server-side secret); older bcrypt hashes are upgraded at the next login |
✅ hashed | |
Public content |
Posts, profiles, groups, comments |
❌ No E2EE | |
IP address |
When you visit via Tor (.onion), our server does not learn it — otherwise it does |
✅ Optional (Tor) | |
⚠️ Known limits
These are the points we see as weaknesses ourselves:
- The server cannot verify whether the classical X25519 part was really mixed into a message; it only sees the label in the package.
- Notifications are delivered by our own push service; Google FCM and browser vendors' web push are switched off. The app fetches content per device encrypted with post-quantum hybrid, browsers and older apps via TLS. Notifications for encrypted messages contain no content; other types (e.g. calls) may contain names.
- This only applies when you open Friendstime in the Tor Browser. Over a normal connection the server knows your IP address — as with any website. Tor hides where you are coming from — not who you are once you sign in to your account. The Android app has no built-in Tor mode.
🐞Found a security vulnerability?
If you discover a vulnerability in Friendstime, please report it to us confidentially through our reporting form — even without an account. It also explains how we handle reports.
❓Frequently asked questions
Is Friendstime end-to-end encrypted?
In part, and this page says exactly what is. End-to-end encrypted (under the conditions in the table): the text of private one-to-one chats with the hybrid scheme (mandatory), media in one-to-one chats, encrypted groups, live location, places and moments in chat, and vault files. Web calls are end-to-end encrypted when everyone involved supports it; in the app this is still rolling out in stages. Not end-to-end encrypted: public content, posts to friends (encryption built, not switched on yet), metadata, call captions, live streams and groups that were never encrypted.
Which methods are used?
For one-to-one chats: key exchange with X25519 and ML-KEM-768 (NIST FIPS 203, a post-quantum method) as a hybrid, combined with HKDF-SHA256, content encrypted with AES-256-GCM. For media, places, moments, live location and vault the keys are wrapped on the same principle (SHA3-256 combiner); moving to a new device adds ML-KEM-1024. Between the browser and our front server, the website connection uses TLS 1.3 with X25519MLKEM768 (older browsers: X25519).
What does "hybrid" mean?
A classical method (X25519) and a post-quantum method (ML-KEM-768) are combined, in case one of them is broken later. It is an extra safety margin; we do not promise protection against every conceivable future attack.
What does the server see despite encryption?
Sender, recipient, time and size of messages; for calls, participants, duration and room. Call captions pass through the server in plain text. Posts to friends and public content are readable. Further limits are listed in the section "Known limits".
Where are the servers?
According to the privacy policy, web hosting, database and e-mail are run by php-friends GmbH (Germany). The media, storage and routing server is operated by netcup GmbH in its Nuremberg data centre.
Has the encryption been audited independently?
No. There has been no independent audit of the encryption so far.
How are passwords stored?
Not in plain text but as a hash (Argon2id, partly with an additional secret server value). Older bcrypt hashes are converted at the next login.
How do I report a security vulnerability?
Via the form at https://friendsti.me/sicherheit-melden.php, no account needed.